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Reassessment without Section 143(2) notice: why participation does not cure non-issuance

By Binay Kumar, Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court of India

Case: Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhubaneswar v. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. & connected appeals • 2026 INSC 1171 • Judgment: 28 Oct 2026 • Reportable

Participation cannot create a notice that was never issued

In income-tax reassessment proceedings, the distinction between a defective service of notice and the complete absence of a mandatory notice is decisive. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v Orissa Mining Corporation concerns that distinction under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Revenue argued that the assessee’s participation in reassessment proceedings cured the procedural difficulty through section 292BB. The Supreme Court rejected the attempt because the mandatory notice contemplated by section 143(2) had not been issued at all. Participation may have consequences where a notice exists and service is disputed; it cannot be used to invent compliance with an antecedent statutory obligation.

What the statutory steps required

Reassessment commences under the statutory reopening framework, including a notice under section 148 and a return filed or treated as filed in response. The question that followed was whether the Assessing Officer had to issue the scrutiny notice required by section 143(2) before completing the process. The Revenue contended that a request to treat an earlier return as the response to section 148 and subsequent cooperation effectively removed the need for a separate section 143(2) notice. The Court addressed these submissions as questions of statutory sequence, not simply whether the taxpayer subjectively knew about the proceeding.

The narrow work of section 292BB

Section 292BB is a statutory deeming rule concerned with service of notice upon an assessee who has participated without timely objection. The Court held that it cannot cure non-issuance because there is no notice whose service may be deemed effective. It likewise rejected the notion that a letter under section 142(1) can stand in for the distinct statutory function of a notice under section 143(2). Nor did the taxpayer’s request to treat a prior return as a reassessment return dispense with the officer’s obligation. These propositions appear in the reasoning and formulated conclusions at paragraphs 15–24.

Why it matters beyond this factual record

Mandatory procedure is often described as technical, but here it defines how statutory power must be exercised. The purpose of a specific notice requirement is not answered simply by showing that the assessee answered other queries. An authority exercising coercive fiscal powers must comply with the procedural conditions Parliament has prescribed. At the same time, the case should not be exaggerated into a rule that any irregularity in notice timing or mode invalidates every assessment. Its core premise was non-issuance of the very notice the law required.

How to frame future disputes

An assessee’s first inquiry should be whether the relevant notice was actually issued, when it was issued, and what record supports its existence and service. The Revenue should produce the notice trail, not rely on generalized references to taxpayer participation. Lawyers should distinguish issue, service, limitation, statutory waiver and objection; they answer different questions and sometimes engage different remedial provisions. The judgment dismissing the Revenue’s appeals concerns the earlier 1961 Act regime and should be applied to new cases only after identifying the governing statutory provisions for the relevant assessment year.

The comparison with Chetan Sabharwal

Chetan Sabharwal (2026 INSC 1163) concerns whether the authority had adequate grounds to begin reassessment. Orissa Mining concerns compliance with a mandatory step after reopening. A strong case may exist for initiation and still fail through a legally consequential procedural omission. Conversely, meticulous service of notices cannot cure an initial reopening unsupported by the statutory threshold. Together the decisions show why reassessment litigation must be divided into stages, with the distinct record and legal test for each.

The statute separates commencement, scrutiny and assessment

The Court treated the role of the notice under section 143(2) as a legally defined requirement after the relevant return had been placed in the reassessment process. A request from the assessee to treat an earlier return as the response to section 148 did not transform a letter issued under a different provision into the mandated scrutiny notice. Nor did the fact of participation cause the missing document to exist. This is why the decision turns on non-issuance, not a minor imperfection in the mode of service. The formulated answers at paragraph 23 distinguish those points explicitly.

Section 292BB does not perform legislative repair

A deeming clause should be read for the legal consequence it actually creates. Section 292BB can deem defects in service cured where its statutory conditions are met, but the Court refused to extend it to non-issuance. To do otherwise would turn a provision about service into a substitute for a notice obligation imposed elsewhere. Practitioners should therefore resist arguments that treat ‘notice’ as a generic bundle of correspondence: each statutory communication serves a distinct procedural function, and the provision and timing matter.

Two stages of tax litigation, two separate tests

The connected comparison with Chetan Sabharwal is instructive but limited. One case asks whether the authority had legally adequate tangible material to reopen; the other asks whether the authority complied with a mandatory scrutiny step once the process was underway. A challenger should plead both, if the record supports both, without assuming one ground proves the other. The Revenue should separately establish the basis for reopening and the existence of the mandatory notice. Contemporary application requires the relevant assessment year, operative sections and any transition from the 1961 regime to be established first.

Judgment and paragraph references

Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhubaneswar v. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. & connected appeals, 2026 INSC 1171, decided 28 Oct 2026. Primary source: judgment of the Supreme Court of India. Principal analysis references: ¶¶ 15–24.

Related Supreme Court analysis

Case reference

Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhubaneswar v. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. & connected appeals • 2026 INSC 1171 • Judgment: 28 Oct 2026 • Reportable. Source: Supreme Court of India judgment.

Author: Binay Kumar, Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court of India; The Justice Law Partners.

Related reading: Taxation & Regulatory.

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